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Abstract—Bayesian networks are a type of causal network used
for probabilistic reasoning, which have found wide application in
biomedical environments and machine vision. We have considered
their application in the realm of security, where behaviour that
is deliberately intended to deceive has to be considered. As a
first step to the the analysis of this behaviour we have analysed
problems in which an one agent provides truthfull, but evasive,
information to the other agents.
The three prisoners problem, and its simpler relation the
Monty Hall problem, are classic examples of statistical analysis
giving rise to counter intuitive results. In this paper the source
of the counter intuitive results is identified as an agent that only
releases partial data about the true state of the system. Further-
more the data that is communicated is a function of the identity
of the agent requesting the data. Under these circumstances two
significant results are demonstrated; first different questioning
agents, will arrive at different probability estimates for the
same problem. Secondly, although if all the data is requested
the estimated probability will converge, the convergence may
be nonmonotonic. This means that some questions, truthfully
answered, will lead to a less precise probability measurement.
Keywords — Bayesian reasoning; three prisoner problem;
I. INTRODUCTION
A reccuring problem in computer science and automation
is reasoning about the truth or falsehood of propositions in
the absence of conclusive evidence. The common example,
from medicine, is to ask if a patient with a set of symptoms
has a particular disease. Symptoms such as fever may occur
with many diseases. Conversely for any disease few symptoms
occur universally, most having some probability of occurring.
As a result, for any set of symptoms a possible set of
diseases can be found. In such cases a means of weighing the
possibilities to indicate how likely they are relative to each
other is required. Similar problems occur in image analysis,
and interpretation, and sensor fusion. In all cases pieces of
data can be assembled to indicate the truth of a propostion:
does a picture contain the image of a cat; does the state of a
set of engine sensors indicate imminent failure.
Problems of this nature appear to require a means of reason-
ing in which likelyhood is distributed within a set of possible
propositions in accordance with the current evidence. Classical
logic is clearly not suitable, as within it a statement must be
true or false, and must not change. A host of techniques have
been developed in responce to this problem — non-monotonic
logic, fuzzy logic, neural networks, probabilistic logic and
Bayesian networks — to list a few.
Choosing between a large set of methods is not easy, as
there will be many relative advantages, often domain specific,
associated with each technique. Our work has concentrated
on Bayesian networks, in particular their application to image
interpretation. We are interested in using Bayesian networks as
a high level tool for interpreting images. By this we mean that
the tool will take fragments, such a line segments or textures,
generated by image analysis techniques and try to classify
the objects or relations in the image. Bayesian networks are
attractive in the domain for two main reasons.
1) They are based in probability theory which is a well
established field of mathematics, so we do not have to
worry about the foundations of the subject.
2) They allow, statistical knowledge about the objects being
looked for, to be built in to the network. For example,
Dick, Torr and Cipolla in their work on extracting
building shapes from photographs [1], were able to
include rules such as windows and doors usually being
vertically aligned.
One major application of image interpretation is in the
security field, where automating the identification of criminal
activity in video surveillance material is desirable. One prob-
lem that would be encountered in this field is the deliberate
obsfucation of material by criminals who, understandably,
wish to avoid capture. Although the problem has arisen in
the context of video surveillance and Bayesian networks, it
is generic to any use of machine reasoning in the presence
of hostile agents. Such applications might include attempts to
detect money laundering by analysing banking transactions, or
the detection of social security fraud by the analysis of claims
records.
As a result, we are interested in the behaviour of Bayesian
networks in the case where there is a deliberate attempt to
deceive them, by the supply of false evidence. This is a very
complicated subject, so we have begun by considering the
games in which an honest participant withholds some informa-
tion from the other players. To this end we have carried out a
detailed examination of the three prisoner problem introduced
by Pearl [2], in which an honest but evasive jailor provides
limited information to prisoners on their fate. The problem
is analysed using Bayesian methods, and we demonstrate
that despite the honesty of the jailor the convergence of the
probabilities is not monotonic.
The next two sections describe the background to our
work, covering Bayesian Networks and the Three Prisoner
Problem. Our contribution occurs in section IV where we
consider adding an observer to the problem, and analyse the
development of the observer’s estimates of the probabilities. It
is from the evolution of the observer’s estimates that we draw
our conclusions.
II. BAYESIAN NETWORKS
In this section the basic theory of Bayesian networks is
outlined, together with some of their current applications. We
concentrate on the basic theory as this will be used in the
analysis of the three prisoner problem in the section III.
A. Bayes’s Theorem
In his account of statistics [3] Thomas Bayes addressed
the problem of the degree to which evidence can be used
to support a hypothosis. Bayes assumed that before the ev-
idence arrived there was some estimate of the probability of
a hypothosis, called the prior probability. The discovery of
evidence should lead to a new probability being calculated,
called the posterior probability. Bayes related the posterior
and prior probabilities in the equation that bears his name,
equation 1.
P (H|E) = P (E|H)P (H)
P (E)
(1)
where
H is the hypothosis E the evidence
P (.) the probability of the parameter
P (H|E) the probability of the hypothosis
given the evidence (posterior)
P (E|H) the probability of the evidence
given the hypothosis is true
The equation is usefull because it is usually relatively easy
to calculate the probability of the evidence on the assumption
that the hypothosis is true. This may then be combined with
the prior probability of the hypothosis and the probability
of the evidence, to generate a new probability the posterior.
The probability of the evidence can usually be found by
combinatorial techniques, evaluating the number of ways the
actual evidence occurred to the total number of ways evidence
could occur.
If evidence is to be provided in discrete pieces over a period
of time, it may be added to the existing evidence and equa-
tion 1 reevaluated. Computationally this can be an expensive
procedure, if nothing else it requires that all the evidence be
stored. Since Bayes’s formula allows new probabilities to be
calculated from old, it would appear that a reccursive version
of the formula should exist that allows incremental updating.
Providing the evidence is independent the following formula
applies.
P (H|En ∧ e) = P (A|En)P (e|En ∧H)
P (e|En) (2)
where
En is a vector of n pieces of data
e is a new piece of data.
∧ is the logical ‘and’ operator
Equation 2 is central to the use of Bayesian statistics,
as it allows new probabilities to be calculated from the
current estimates, without reassessing all the evidence that has
currently been received. Algorithms for Bayesian reasoning
that use only equation 1 tend to be time and space intensive,
unless they can find specific features of the domain that allow
quick recalculation of the combined probabilities of the new
and old evidence.
B. Bayesian Networks
In the previous section we considered Bayes’s rule as a
means of updating probabilities in the light of streams of
evidence. It can also be used to compute probabilities of
events that are related by cause and effect rules. Considering a
number of discreet variables, statistical relationships between
them may be noticed, which relate to the presence of cause and
effect relationships between the variables. For example, the
probability of a person on a street using an umbrella correlates
to the truth of the variable “is raining”. The natural way of
handling the correlations it to build a joint distribution table
in the form of an array, indexed by the states of the variables,
containing the probability of each combination of values.
The problem with such an approach is that for most real
problems the table becomes very large, also many of the
probabilities are zero, as they are the probability of an effect
without its cause. To handle these problems an alternative rep-
resentation can be used, in which cause and effect relationships
between variables are represented in a directed graph. The
nodes of the graph are the variables, and the edges represent
the cause and effect relationships between variables. Each
node contains a conditional probability table, describing the
probable outcomes of the variable in the node in terms of the
values of its parents. We do not allow cyclic cause and effect
relationships, and hence the graph must contain no directed
cycles, resulting in a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Whithin
the graph equations 1 or 2 may be used to update the the
individual nodes.
Once set up a Bayesian network may be queried to find
the probability of some outcome variables in terms of known
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Fig. 1. Detecting a vehicle using a magnetic loop detector and a video
camara, taken from [5]. On the left is a simple Bayesian sensor fusion network,
in which the probabilities of a magnetic sensor and a video sensor for detecting
a vehicle are known. Whenever one or both sensors give a signal we can
compute the probability of a vehicle being present. On the right a fog sensor
has been added, since fog can effect the performance of a video sensor but not
a magnetic sensor, the node for fog is only linked to the video sensor node. The
conditional probability associated with the video sensor now include a term
for the presence of fog, the whole network will now adapt to the environment
as a result.
query variables. There are two ways of doing this: exact
inference in which all the probabilities are worked out starting
from the query and leading to the outcome; and approximate
inference in which the probabilities are approximated by
sampling from the network. The details of these techniques
are not important to the current paper. Some example of the
applications of Bayesian networks follow.
a) Shape Reconstruction: Han [4] has developed a means
of reconstructing three dimensional shape from a single image,
using Bayesian networks containing prior knowledge about the
shapes. Previous approaches to shape reconstruction used
1) Reconstruction 3D shapes from line drawings with hu-
man input to fill in the hidden lines
2) Construct a two and a half dimensional map using focus,
texture and shading information, then parse this into a
3D model. This requires some prior model information,
and is prone to lighting errors.
3) Computing the shape from multiple images, which re-
quires multiple images be available.
Han first segmented a single image then extracted artifacts
in the form of graphs of vertices, edges, planes, and curves.
A Bayesian network was trained to detect known classes of
objects from the graphs and produce a 3D reconstruction of
them. Finally a scene graph showing the support relations
between the object was developed.
b) Sensor Fusion: In sensor fusion the approach of ma-
chine vision is extended with several sensors — not necessarily
cameras — being used to identify objects. The simplist case
of sensor fusion is to combine two sensors, using the known
probabilities of each to produce a correct result. Bayes’s rule
for conditional probabilities is an obvious way of achieving
this. In this case a simple model of the probability of each
sensor detecting an object can be built, and used to compute
the probability of an object being present for any set of sensor
readings. Such a network can also be extended to include
background knowledge [5], an example is described in figure
1.
III. THE THREE PRISONERS PROBLEM
In this section we present our analysis of the three prisoner
problem, in Bayesian terms. We start, however, with the
simpler Monty Hall problem. While neither of these problems
involves active deception, in both cases the agent providing
the information is always truthfull, they do involve the con-
cealment of vital data. It is our hope that analysis of these
problems will provide a stepping stone handling deception by
an overtly hostile agent.
A. The Monty Hall Problem
The name comes from the host of the television game show
“Let’s make a deal”, widely syndicated in the USA. In the
finale of the show a contestant was offered the chance to win a
car. The vehicle was hidden behind one of three doors and the
contestant has to guess which door hid the car. At this stage the
host opened one of the two remaining doors, not concealing
a car, and and then invited the contestant to choose between
sticking with his or her original choice, or swapping for the
remaining closed door. The problem is, should the contestant
swap? The solution was published in [6].
The common and incorrect answer is as follows, there were
three doors hence a one third probability of finding the car.
Now one door has been removed the probability must be
one half, so changing makes no difference. The problem with
this analysis is that the show’s host knows which door the
contestant has chosen, which door hides the car, and must not
end the show by revealing the car, when selecting the which
door to open.
A look at possible alternative games is rewarding. Self
evidently if one door was opened, revealing no car, before
the contestant chose a door, the probability of the contestants
choice being correct would be one half. Next consider the
contestant choosing first and the host opens one of the two
remaining doors at random. In one third of cases the car is
revealed and the game ends, but in the remaining two thirds
the the probability of the contestant being correct is one half.
The correct analysis of the problem is to observe that
in the initial choice made by the contestant, the probability
of selecting a door hiding the car is one third, hence the
probability of the car being behind one of the other doors
is two thirds. The crutial component of the analysis is the
behaviour of the host. The host knows which door has been
chosen by the contestant and which door hides the car. Two
thirds of the time the contestant has chosen the wrong door,
one of the remaining two doors hides the car and the host
opens the other one. Alternatively if the contestant has chosen
the door hiding the car, the host open one of the two remaining
doors at random. Nothing the host has done alters the one
third probability of the contestant’s first choice being right,
so the probabilities are now one third the contestant being
correct, two thirds the remaining door hiding the car. Clearly
the contestant should swap.
To express the problem in Bayesian form it must first be
represented in the form of logical propositions.
D = the door selected by the contestant hides the car
I = an arbitrary door not selected by contestant is opened
Next the propostions are substituted Bayes’s formula 1.
P (G|I) = P (I|G)P (G)
P (I)
(3)
Finally values must be found for the probabilities on the
right hand side of equation 3. Clearly P (G) = 1/3 since this
is the prior probability of the contestant selecting a door hiding
a car, also P (I|G) = 1/2 since there are two doors and the
choice was arbitrary. This leaves the value of P (I) to be found.
The host only makes the choice of which door to open after
the contestant has selected a door, this leave the host with a
choice of two doors. Since the door in the proposition D was
arbitrary, the probability P (I) = 1/2. Inserting these values
into equation 3, give the correct answer 1/3.
The error that leads to the answer 1/2, is assuming that
P (I) = 1/3, in which case equation 3 yields P (G|I) = 1/2.
This is wrong because it uses the prior probability of selecting
a door as the probability for the host choosing any door, when
one door has already been removed from the choice by the
contestant. This highlights the fact that prior probabilities must
be calculated relative to the current state of the system, not
the initial state.
B. Three Prisoner Problem
The three prisoner problem is an extension of the Monty
Hall, problem introduced by Pearl [2]. In the three prisoner
problem a tyrant has imprisoned three people (Alice, Bob and
Charlie), under the condition that, in the morning one will
be executed, but none are to be told who is to be executed
untill the execution itself. One prisoner, Alice, asks to see
the jailor and, pointing out that at least one of the other two
prisoners must be released, asks to be told the name of one
fellow prisoner who will be released. The jailor consents and
says Charlie.
The question is should Alice swap places with Bob? The
answer, following the above analysis of the Monty Hall,
problem is no. Forming the question in propositional form.
I = Jailor tells Alice, Bob will be released
A = Alice will be executed
Substitute into 1.
P (A|I) = P (I|A)P (A)
P (I)
(4)
The probability of the jailor saying Bob if Alice is to be
executed P (C|I) is 1/2, since, if Alice is to be executed, the
jailor has a random choice, and we assume no bias between
Bob and Charlie. The probability of Alice being executed
P (A) is 1/3, again assuming a random choice by the tyrant.
This only leaves the probability of the jailor naming Bob P (I),
since Alice is asking the question, there are only two names
that can be given, so the probability is 1/2. Inserting these
numbers in equation 4 the probability of Alice being executed
is 1/3, while Bob has a chance of 2/3.
One interesting corollary of the problem is that the proba-
bilities are not independent of the person asking the question.
If Bob asked the jailor the same question and received the
answer Charlie, he would compute his probability of being
executed at 1/3 and give Alice 2/3. Since the identity of the
prisoner asking the question is a parameter the jailor has to
take into account in answering this is inevitable.
C. Role of the Jailor
Given the importance of the jailor’s behaviour, this role is
now examined. The jailor has two directives.
1) The jailor must not tell a prisoner wheather they will be
executed or released.
2) The jailor should be honest when answering the ques-
tion, “Name one person who will be released?”.
The algorithm is simple. If the person asking the question is
to be released, then one of the other prisoners is to be executed,
so the jailor names the other one. Alternatively if the person
asking the question is the one to be executed, select the name
of one of the other two at random. In effect the jailor is a
communication channel, transmitting data on the current state
of the jail to the prisoner asking the question. The identity
of the prisoner asking the question is a parameter used in
selecting the data.
Using this approach to the problem, we can give a frequen-
tist account of the statistics, using the more humane, but less
melodramatic, senario in which the selected prisoner has to
do that day’s cleaning. Now consider Alice asking who will
not be cleaning the prison tomorrow. Approximately one in
every three days she will get the answer Charlie, because Bob
will be doing the cleaning. However, on approximately one in
every six days she will get the answer Charlie, because she
is doing the cleaning and the jailor chose to name Charlie,
the other one in six she will be cleaning but the jailor names
Bob. This gives the probability of 1/3 of doing the cleaning
we found above in III-B. Symmetrical results apply if Bob or
Charlie ask the question.
IV. AN OBSERVER OF THREE PRISONER PROBLEM
In the preceeding sections it was assumed that the prisoners
had no means of communicating with each other, and therefor
could not compare the answers given by the jailor. Here
the limitation is addressed, not by allowing the prisoners to
communicate, but by adding an observer aware of all questions
and answers to the problem. As before the analysis begins with
a representation of the problem in propositional form.
I1 = Jailor tells Alice, Bob will be released
I2 = Jailor tells Bob, Alice will be released
I3 = Jailor tells Charlie, Bob will be released
A = Alice will be executed
We will consider two scenarios, both beginning with Alice
questioning the jailor and receiving the reply Bob. This allows
the analysis presented in section III-B to be reused for the
probabilities after the jailor has answered the first question.
Scenario One: In the first scenario, Bob also questions
the jailor and is told Alice. Combinatorially it is trivial for
the observer to determine that Charlie is the unlucky prisoner
to be executed. However we wish to do the calculation using
Bayesian methods. To do that we substitute the propostions
into the Bayes’s recursive updating formula, equation 2.
P (A|I1 ∧ I2) = P (A|I1)P (I2|I1 ∧A)
P (I2|I1) (5)
Clearly if Alice is to be executed the answer I2 is im-
possible, since the jailor does not lie. This makes the term
P (I2|I1 ∧A) equal zero, and hence the overall probability is
zero, which is in accordance with the combinatorial result.
Scenario Two: In the second scenario, the second pris-
oner to question the jailor is Charlie and he receives the
answer, Bob. As before the probabilities are substituted in
Bayes’s law.
P (A|I1 ∧ I3) = P (A|I1)P (I3|I1 ∧A)
P (I3|I1) (6)
The first term, the probability of Alice being executed given
the jailor told her Bob would be released, was calculated to
be 1/3 in section III-B. The probability of the jailor telling
Charlie that Bob will be released, given Alice will be executed
is one. Hence P (I3|I1 ∧ A) is equal to one, the occurrence
of proposition I1 in the term making no difference. The
remaining probability is that of propostion I3 occurring given
I1 has occurred P (I3|I1). It is important to note that this does
not include the probability that Charlie will ask a question after
Alice. The order in which the prisoners question the jailor
is given as part of the problem, and is not involved in the
statistics.
In calculating P (I3|I1) it is important to observe the data
that has already been obtained from I1. Bob is not going to be
executed and, as Alice asked the question she has a 1/3 chance
of being executed, while Charlie the current questioner, has
a 2/3 probability. There are two ways in which the answer
Bob can occur, the probability is the sum of the individual
probabilities for each option. First Charlie is to be executed,
which occurs with a probability of 2/3. In this case the jailor
has a random choice of Alice or Bob, so Bob is selected with
overall probability 2/3 × 1/2 = 1/3. The other alternative is
that Alice is to be executed and as a result the jailor must
reply “Bob”. The probability of this is clearly the probability
of Alice being executed 1/3. The overall probability is the
sum of the probabilities of these two alternative branches, 2/3.
Inserting these figures into equation 6 gives the result that the
probability of Alice being executed has risen to 1/2, while that
of Charlie has dropped to 1/2.
In this scenario a third question is needed in which Bob asks
the jailor for the name of one person who will be released.
This question will act as a decider producing a probability of
Data Alice Bob Charlie
1/3 1/3 1/3
I1 1/3 0 2/3
I2 1/2 0 1/2
I3 0 0 1
TABLE I
THE CHANGING PROBABILITIES IN REPONCE TO QUESTIONS ASKED OF
THE JAILOR.
one, for Alice or Charlie. If Charlie is the unlucky victim, one
important feature of the probabilities becomes clear, they do
not monotonically converge. This is illustrated in table I, in
which the probabilities of the three prisoners are listed, with an
added final propostion I4 = the jailor tells Bob, Alice will be
released. In this case the probability of Charlie being executed
starts at 1/3, raises to 2/3, drops to 1/2, before finally rising
to one.
It is inevitable that when all three prisoners have questioned
the jailor the identity of the victim will be found, the com-
binatoric nature of the problem guarantees that. The system
of Bayesian estimators will converge to that answer, within
the floating point accuracy of the computational machinery
on which it is implemented. However, there is no guarantee
that the convergence will be monotonic, for some steps in the
process the probabilities may relax.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Most analysis of the behaviour of Bayesian networks has
been based on the assumption of relatively ‘well behaved’
evidence. This is natural as most applications have been in the
physical, biological or social sciences, in which cases the the
evidence may be subject to errors, possibly systematic, but not
deliberate evasion or deception. Issues relating to deliberate
evasion or deception will have to be faced if Bayesian (or
any other) methods are applied in the field of security. The
analysis of simple games can be used to examine some of the
problems encountered in this field.
The analysis of the three prisoner problem has been in-
volved, and has given rise to several observations about the
behaviour of a recursively updated Bayesian system.
1) In systems representing ‘games’ in which an agent
provides information on the current state of the game
(the host or jailor in the examples), it is best to interpret
this agent as a communications channel reporting the
current state.
2) If the identity of the agent requesting information from
the communications agent is a parameter, used to de-
cide what information is returned, then the probabilities
derived by different agents may not be equivalent.
3) Although the Bayesian estimators will eventually con-
verge to the correct answer, assuming an honest commu-
nications agent, the convergence will not be monotonic.
At some stages the correct proposition may become less
lightly.
The three prisoner problem may be a rather artificial ex-
ample, but it is indicative of a range of problems relating to
games. It has some similarities to an investigation, in which
witnesses may limit their answers to avoid incriminating or
embarrassing themselves. It also provides a stepping stone to
the more realistic and complex domains in which agents are
actually deceitful. Finally, it illustrates the dangers of relying
on assumptions about the behaviour of statistics derived from
physical, biological or social science, in the fields of games
and security.
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